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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
BURTON 0. COMPTON, BURTON 
STANLEY COMPTON, AND LES-
TER 0. COMPTON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
OGDEN UNION RAILWAY AND DE-
POT COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
7541 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
PRELIMINARY STAT·EMENT 
The parties will be designated herein as they were at 
the trial. 
This is an action brought by the surviving husband and 
sons of Mrs. Emma Compton, who was killed by defend-
ant's diesel engine on September 8, 1949. We understand 
plaintiff Burton 0. Compton, the only plaintiff who was 
in any measure dependent upon the deceased, has died since 
the trial, but we realize this fact does not affect the appeal. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
The fatal accident out of which the action arose occurred on 
the defe:Qdant's track in the vicinity of the 24th Street via-
duct in Ogden, Utah. The deceased was a pedestrian. 
At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' ·evidence at the 
trial and in the absence of the jury, defendant orally moved 
the court for a judgment of nonsuit in its favor and against 
the plaintiffs. After hearing arguments by counsel the 
trial court granted the defendant's motion and in written 
conclusions of law which it filed the court ruled that the 
deceased was guilty of negligence directly and proximately 
contributing to her death. The court determined as one of 
its findings that a jury question was presented as to the · 
negligence of the defendant, and hence that issue is not 
involved in this appeal. For this reason, the evidence as to 
the use of the area for travel by the ~eneral public, evidence 
designed to establish the status of the deceased as a licensee 
and fix upon the defendant a duty of keeping a reasonable 
lookout for her, is unimportant in this appeal. Only two 
questions are involved, viz : vVas the deceased contributorily 
negligent, and if so, did the defendant have the last clear 
chance to a void the accident? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant accepts the statement of facts contained 
in plaintiff's brief with the following exceptions and addi-
tions: We believe statements contained therein respecting 
the use made of the area by the general public unnecessary 
but harmless. It was our understanding that the witness 
Mrs. Earl E. Laws testified the deceased took a definite 
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number of steps down the track before the impact, but we 
concede the written record is as plaintiffs have reported 
it in their statement of facts. Plaintiffs state·, at page 4 of 
their brief, that witness Feller testified that a person walk-
ing from the base of the stairs toward the track along the 
path would reach the point of impact before he could see 
down the track. It is true he so testified, but~:'on further 
examination he clarified this statement, and at page 26 of 
the Record he stated that a clear view was available to the 
deceased down the track in the direction from which the 
engine approached from the time she took one step beyond 
the posts shown in defendant's Exhibit 2. Also, this same 
witness identified defendant's Exhibit 2 as being a repre-
sentation of the view available to the deceased at a point 
approximately 10 feet north of the track (R. 51). The 
deceased approached from the north (R. 8, 45). 
We believe on the issue of the deceased's contributory 
negligence the physical evidence as disclosed by defendant's 
Exhibits 1 and 2 and plaintiffs' Exhibits D and I is im-
portant. From these exhibits the court can learn the ap-
proximate view available to the deceased as she walked to-
ward the track. Plaintiffs' evidence disclosed the engine 
was traveling about 10 miles per hour (R. 10). It was a 
clear, bright morning (R. 47, 48). The deceased walked in 
a southerly direction 25 feet from the bottom of the viaduct 
stairs to the point of the accident (R. 8, 19-20, 45). The 
engine approached from the northwest (R. 9, 12). Defend-
ant's Exhibit 2 shows the view available to deceased looking 
northwesterly up the track from any point 10 feet north of 
the track (R. 51). Reference to the map of the area shows 
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it is approximately 370 feet from the point of impact to 
the east side of the bridge shown in defendant's Exhibit 2. 
This exhibit shows a clear view was available to deceased to 
a point far beyond and northwest of this bridge. Defend-
ant's Exhibit 1 shows more clearly the straight track ex-
tending far to the northwest of this bridge. If there was 
an engine anywhere on the track within the view shown in 
defendant's Exhibit 2, Mrs. Compton should have seen it. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit D shows in reverse the view avail-
able to deceased. This photograph was taken at a point on 
the track approximately 100 feet northwest of the point of 
impact (R. 24). Under plaintiffs' evidence as to its speed, 
the engine was at the point where this photograph was taken 
about seven seconds before the accident. The only reasonable 
inference from the evidence is that the engine was some-
where between the point where this photograph was taken 
and the point of impact at the time Mrs. Compton was 
walking from the posts shown in the exhibit to the point 
of impact. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit I shows in reverse the view avail-
able to deceased back to approximately the west side of the 
bridge (R. 57). This would be over 300 feet from the point 
of impact. P.~.ssuming it took deceased eight seconds to walk 
the 25 feet from the bottom of the stairs to the place where 
she was struck, which would be a slow pace, the engine 
would have had to travel over 25 miles per hour to move in 
the same time from the place where this photograph was 
taken to the point of the accident. Assuming it took the 
deceased four seconds to walk from the posts shown in this 
exhibit to the point of impact, the engine would have had 
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to travel over 50 miles per hour to move in the same four 
seconds from the place where this photograph was taken 
to the point of the accident. Plaintiffs' evidence shows the 
engine was moving only 10 miles per hour. Both plaintiffs' 
and defendant's exhibits show beyond any doubt that the 
engine was visible to the deceased had she looked before 
approaching the track. 
On the issue of last clear chance we believe the fol-
lowing evidence is important. The crew members on defend-
ant's engine which struck the deceased did not see her until 
after the engine had passed over her body ( R. 10, 28) . There 
was no evidence that the deceased had caught her foot, 
fallen, or was otherwise physically unable to extricate her-
self from her position of peril prior to the accident. The 
evidence is that she was walking at the time of the collision 
(R. 46, 47). The point of impact was 25 feet from the bot-
tom of the viaduct stairway which the deceased descended 
(R. 8, 19, 20). At the closest point, the track is 171/2 feet 
from the bottom of the stairway (R. 20). Officer Feller 
testified that it was his observation that I\1rs. Compton was 
struck just as she arrived at the track (R. 21, 22). He 
further testified the point of impact was straight south of 
the bottom of the viaduct stairs. Mrs. Laws testified that 
just about the time she and Mrs. Compton got up close to 
the track the train came by ( R. 48) . Again she testified 
that she and the deceased walked a few steps along the path 
before the accident occurred (R. 50). 
All of the above facts are undisputed. 
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT RE-
VERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THAT THE DECEASED, EMMA 
COMPTON, WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLI-
GENT. 
The determination of whether or not the deceased was 
contributorily negligent as a matter of law involve-s con-
sideration of fundamental and elementary principles of 
the law of negligence. Our problem is materially simplified 
by the fact that there are Utah cases covering practically 
·every proposition in dispute, and there are practically no 
conflicts among these applicable decisions. We have ex-
amined all of the Utah cases cited by plaintiffs in their 
brief, and we find fault with none of them. Some of them 
are quoted herein as authority for the propositions we urge. 
In view of the. uniformity among the Utah cases on the 
questions involved, it is. not surprising to find both parties 
citing identical cases as authority for their opposing con-
tentiop.s. We believe the Utah cases cited by plaintiffs are 
right. We believe plaintiffs are wrong in their interpreta-
tions or applications of these cases. And yet the clear 
language of the cases is not susceptible of such misuse. 
We shall commence our consideration of the issue of 
contributory negligence, as did plaintiffs in their brief, 
with the presumption that at the time of the fatal collision 
the deceased was exercising due care for her own safety. 
It is necessary that we first determine the nature and effect 
of this presumption. The presumption that deceased at the 
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time of her death was exercising due care springs from an 
acknowledgment by the law of the strong instinct of self-
preservation. Like the presumption of sanity (State v. 
Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P. 2d 177), and the presumption of 
intent in the delivery of a deed (In Re Newell's· Estate, 
78 Utah 463, 5 P. 2d 230) , and the presumption of control 
of an automobile (Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 P. 2d 
1049), it is a presumption of law as distinguished from a 
presumption of fact. As such, the presumption exists only 
so long as there is no evidence presented showing the cir-
cumstances surrounding the death. 
As stated by the Utah court in Ryan v. Union Pac. R. 
Co., 46 Utah 530, 151 P. 71: 
"In the absence of evidence there is a presump-
tion that the deceased used due care and, for his 
protection, did all that reasonably was required of 
him. Had the court charged that and stopped, the 
charge would not have been erroneous. Vvhen, how- · 
ever, facts and circumstances are proven to show 
just what the deceased did, or failed to do, then his 
care, or the want of it, is to be determined, not on the 
presumption, but upon the facts and circumstances 
proven. That is, whenever the facts or circumstances 
are shown concerning which the presumption is in-
dulged, the presumption ceases, and the controversy 
is to be decided by the weight of the evidence ad-
duced. * * *" 
In Clark v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co., 73 Utah 
486, 275 P. 582, the court discussed the nature and effect of 
this presumption. On appeal the defendant assigned as 
error an instruction by the court that the deceased was 
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exercising due care at the time of the accident. In sustain-
ing the exception to this instruction, the court said : 
"The claim in such particular is that the court 
by such instruction in effect directed the jury that 
there was such a presumption regardless of what 
the evidence might be bearing on the question of the 
care or the want of it exercised by the deceased. In 
such particular it is urged that the court ought to 
have directed the jury that such a presumption only 
exists or may be indulged, in the absence or inde-
pendently of evidence as to the care or the want of it 
exercised by the deceased, or of facts or circum-
stances from which inferences may be deduced with 
respect thereto; but, when evidence or facts and 
circumstances respecting such matters are adduced, 
then the question of the care or the want of it ex-
ercised by the deceased is to be determined on the 
evidence and facts and circumstances, and not upon 
the presumption. The rule contended for by the ap-
pellant is the rule prevailing in this jurisdiction. 
Ryan v. Un. Pac. R. Co., 46 Utah 530, 151 P. 71; 
State v. Steadman (Utah) 259 P. 326. 
"In some jurisdictions. cases may be found where 
it is held that presumptions have evidentiary force, 
and as such may be considered. But in most of such 
cases it will be seen that the matter dealt with was 
a presumption or inference of fact, and not a pre-
sumption of law, or where the former was mistaken 
or misconceived for the latter. As is recognized 
generally by authors on evidence as well as by ad-
judged cases, there is a well-defined distinction be-
tween a presumption of law and a presumption of 
fact. Not observing the distinction has led to con-
fusion in some of the cases. This is clearly pointed 
out by the author, 1 Elliott on Evidence, Paragraph 
76; and in 1 Jones Comms. on Evidence (2d Ed.) 
Paragraph 23, where it is said that 'no word in the 
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legal parlance is used in a greater variety of sense, 
or more frequently misused, than the word "pre-
sumption." Confusion of the use extends, in fact, 
beyond that term and includes as well the companion 
words "assumption" and "inference."' When the 
term 'presumption of law,' is properly kept in mind, 
it is quite clear that such a presumption but per-
forms the office or effect as indicated in the Ryan 
and Steadman Cases, and, as shown by the texts 
heretofore cited, to temporarily or in the first in-
stance relieve the party in whose favor the presump-
tion arises from going forward with evidence and to 
cast upon the party against whom it works the duty 
of going forward with evidence and of proving by 
a preponderance thereof a state of facts or circum-
stances inconsistent with the presumption, or, in 
other words, to prove the charged negligence of the 
deceased, unless such negligence is shown by the 
evidence adduced on the part of the plaintiff. But, 
when such evidence is adduced, the question of 
whether the party on whom the burden of proof 
rested has or has not sustained the burden by the re-
quired quantum of evidence is to be determined upon 
the evidence adduced and upon all the facts and cir-
cumstances in evidence, and not upon the presump-
tion. In such case, the presumption of law has no 
evidentiary force or effect. * * *" 
A presumption of law cannot be weighed with evidence, 
and once the facts are shown the presumption drops out 
of the picture completely and no longer exists.. See Peterson 
v. Sorensen, 91 Utah 507, 65 P. 2d 12; Buhler v. Maddison, 
109 Utah 245, 166 P. 2d 205; In re Pilcher's Estate, 
Utah . 0 0, 197 P. 2d 143. 
The plaintiffs in their brief apparently concede the 
above to be true. The cases quoted by them are consistent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
with that rule, although under the peculiar facts of those 
cases the presumption of law prevailed because in each there 
was no evidence produced as to the manner in which the 
death occurred. Thus in Lewis v. Rio Grande Western Ry. 
Co., 40 Utah 483, 123 P. 97, which is cited by plaintiffs at 
page 10 of their brief, the body of the deceased was found 
lying alongside the railroad track. Nothing was learned of 
the circumstances of his death and no evidence was intro-
duced at the trial with respect thereto. There being no 
evidence, the legal presumption of due care remained un-
refuted. 
Likewise, Perrin v. Union Pacific R. Co., 59 Utah 1, 
201 P. 405, quoted by plaintiffs at page 12 of their brief, 
was a case in which there was no evidence to show how the 
accident occurred. We quote from the court's opiniol} in 
that case: 
"* * * The instruction (that the deceased 
exercised due care) is applicable only in the absence 
of evidence as to just how the accident happened. 
There was no eyewitness. It is only in such cases 
that litigants are entitled to this or a like instruction. 
* * *" (Parentheses added.) 
While apparently conceding the nature and effect of 
this legal presumption, plaintiffs' counsel contend that the 
presumption applies in this case because there was no 
evidence as to how the fatal accident occurred. We are 
at a loss to understand how they can seriously urge this 
contention when they themselves placed on the stand an 
eyewitness who detailed the complete circumstances sur-
rounding Mrs. Compton's death. Through this testimony 
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produced by the plaintiffs we are able to trace Mrs. Comp-
ton's movements from a few moments before until the very 
moment of her fatal accident. We know that she, in com-
pany with another woman, the eyewitness, Mrs. Laws, 
descended the stairway at the 24th Street viaduct, walked 
toward the track of the defendant railway along a little 
path running beside the track, and was struck and killed 
by one of the defendant's engines. We know from the evi-
dence what she did and what she did not do. We are 
acquainted with the circumstances surrounding her death, 
and we must examine those known circumstances to de-
termine whether or not she was negligent. The question is 
this: Does the evidence show the deceased was contribu-
torily negligent? If so, there is no presumption of due care 
with which to concern ourselves. If the evidence shows 
contributory negligence, the presumption falls before that 
evidence and passes out of the picture. 
We must next, then, direct our attention to the evi-
dence and the la \V applicable thereto to determine if it shows 
as a matter of law that the deceased was contributorily 
negligent. V\l e shall first consider what duties the law im-
poses upon a person in the position of the deceased at the 
time of the accident. 
In Butler v. Payne, 59 Utah 383, 203 P. 869, the earlier 
Utah cases announcing the duty of a traveler approaching 
a railroad track are collated. The rule announced in this 
case is as follows: 
"The proposition that it is the duty of travelers 
before attempting to cross a railroad track upon 
which trains are being operated to both look and 
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listen for an approaching train has been affirmed 
by this court in numerous well-considered cases, and 
has long since been the established law in this juris-
diction. * * *" 
See also: 
Jensen v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 44 Utah 100, 
138 P. 1185. 
Lawrence v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 52 Utah 
414, 174 P. 817. 
Teakle v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 32 
Utah 276, 90 P. 402. 
Wilkinson v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 35 Utah 
110, 99 P. 466. 
Oswald v. Utah Light & Ry. Co., 39 Utah 245, 
117 P. 46. 
Steggell v. Salt Lake & Utah R. Co., 50 Utah 
139, 167 P. 237. 
Kent, et al. v. Ogden L. & I. Ry. Co., 50 Utah 
328, 167 P. 666. 
The rule of these and other cases decided by our own 
court has received such wide application and has been so 
almost universally applied as to be fundamental and ele-
mentary. The rule is announced as follows in 44 American 
Jurisprudence, Railroads, Paragraph 477: 
"Ordinarily, one who attempts to cross or who 
goes or walks upon or near a railroad track without 
looking and listening when by so doing he might dis-
cover the danger from an approaching train, is 
quilty of contributory negligence which will defeat 
his right to recover for his injuries, unless there is 
a want of reasonable care on the part of the em-
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ployees of the company after becoming aware of the 
perilous situation of the person injured. The track 
is itself a warning. It is a place of danger. It can 
never be assumed that cars are not approaching 
on a track, or that there is no danger therefrom, 
nor can one in full possession of his faculties who 
goes upon a railroad track and fails to use his senses 
for his own safety and is injured as a consequence 
plead absent-mindedness to absolve himself from 
negligence. This duty is a continuing one as long as 
the person is upon the tracks. The duty of one on a 
railroad track to look out for trains is, generally 
speaking, the same whether he is a licensee, invitee, 
or trespasser, for an invitation or a license to use 
railroad tracks does not carry with it the right to 
obstruct the road and impede the passage of trains. 
* * *" 
Also, it is a rule, of perhaps equally wide application 
that if a traveler approaching a railroad track by looking 
could have seen an approaching train, a presumption of 
fact arises from the accident that he either negligently 
failed to look or negligently failed to see what was there 
to be seen or negligently failed to heed what he saw. In any 
event, he is negligent. For a few of the Utah cases an-
nouncing this rule, see: Teakle v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. 
R. Co., supra; Wilkinson v. Oregon Short Lt"ne R. Co., supra; 
and Ryan v. Union Pacific R. Co., supra. 
We do not believe plaintiffs' counsel will on serious 
reflection question the legal accuracy of these principles. 
Such being the law, it remains only to apply that law to the 
facts of this case. Those facts, as presented by plaintiffs' 
own witnesses, show as a matter of law that the deceased 
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failed to exercise reasonable care for her own safety and 
hence was negligent. 
Plaintiffs' witness., Officer Feller, testified that there 
was a clear view available to deceased up the track in the 
direction from which the engine approached at any point 
from approximately 10 feet from the north rail of the track 
right up to the point of impact. That her view was not ob-
structed by the concrete abutment is shown by defendant's 
Exhibit 2 and plaintiffs' Exhibit D and I. These exhibits, 
when examined in connection with the map of the area, 
show that her view was clear and unobstructed for a dis-
tance well in .excess of 300 feet up the track. Plaintiffs' 
evidence was that the train traveled at a speed of 10 miles 
an hour, or less than 15 feet per second. Under the evidence 
as to speed, plaintiffs themselves proved beyond substantial 
doubt the deceased was contributorily negligent when they 
introduced their Exhibit D, taken 100 feet northwest of the 
point of impact. They left no doubt at all on the question 
when they introduced their Exhibit I, taken back near the 
west side of the bridge. As is apparent from these exhibits, 
Mrs. Compton had a clear view at least back to the bridge, 
and under the evidence the train had to be within 100 feet 
of the point of impact when she was at the posts, and most 
certainly it had to be between the bridge and the point of 
impact. Defendant's Exhibit 2, which merely shows an 
enlargement of the view available, is unnecessary, but it 
certainly clinches the point. The engine did not come out of 
nowhere to strike her. We have to place it on the track, 
and when we do we place it where she should have seen 
it if she looked. If at any time after she passed the poles 
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shown in these exhibits, which poles are approximately 10 
feet from the track, she had but made a cursory observation 
up the track, she would have seen the engine approaching. 
Certainly, if she had looked before walking right up next 
to the rail or so close thereto as to be in a position of danger, 
she \Vould have observed the engine. Such inference is the 
only reasonable one from the facts presented at the trial, 
and it leads inevitably to the conclusion as a matter of law 
that she failed to exercise reasonable care. The facts in this 
case are so similar to the facts in the many Utah cases 
heretofore cited in which plaintiff was held to be contribu-
torily negligent as a rna tter of law that not even fine dis-
tinctions can be drawn between them. We believe that per-
haps none of the cases is as free from doubt as is this one. 
Plaintiffs have not cited a single case from Utah or else-
where in which, under facts similar to those here present, 
the jury was permitted to deliberate on the issue of con-
tributory negligence. Plaintiffs' counsel do not and cannot 
reasonably argue that the established Utah law on this issue 
is wrong and should now be changed. They seek only to 
by-pass the clear import of the law by two devious routes. 
First, they argue that the law is not applicable to the facts 
of this case; and secondly, they seek to excuse Mrs. Comp-
ton's obvious neglect by several rather feeble excuses. In 
pursuing their first route they fail or refuse to recognize the 
undisputed evidence in the record. In pursuing their second, 
we believe they ignore the law. 
Listed categorically, the explanations by means of 
which they seek to excuse the negligence of the deceased 
are as follows : 
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1. That she may have looked while her view 
was obstructed by the abutment and seen nothing. 
2. That she was not required to maintain a 
lookout to the northwest while she was walking 
southeast. 
3. That the deceased was entitled to rely upon 
her sense of hearing, and the engine sneaked up on 
her quietly coasting down grade. 
4. That it is not clear from the evidence that 
even if she had looked at any point within 10 feet 
from the track the engine would have been seen. 
Respecting the first explanation, assuming Mrs. Comp-
ton looked at a time when her view down the tracks was 
obstructed by the abutment, she was not then entitled to 
assume that no train was approaching. Since there was 
ample opportunity for her to make a reasonable observation 
after she had passed the obstruction, it was her duty to do 
so. 
See: 
Drummond v. Union Pac. R. Co., 111 Utah 
289, 177 p. 2d 903. 
Sprague v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 40 Mont. 
481, 107 P. 412. 
Eaton v. Southern Pac. Co., 22 Cal. App. 461, 
134 P. 801. 
Chicago, R. I. and P. Ry. Co. v. Wheelbarger, 
75 Kan. 811, 88 P. 531. 
Stephenson v. Northwestern Pac. R. Co., 208 
Cal. 7 49, 284 P. 913. 
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Nor can counsel find comfort in the law respecting their 
contention that she vfas only required to look in the direction 
in which she \Vas traveling. Since it might be anticipated 
trains vvould come from either direction, she was required 
to look in both directions before entering a position of 
peril along the track. See Bates v. San Ped'ro, L. A. & S. L. 
R. Co., 38 Utah 568, 114 P. 527; Drummond v. Union Pac. R. 
Co., supra. The law just does not countenance such an ex-
cuse for an obvious breach of duty. 
It may be true, as counsel contend in their third ex-
planation, that the engine coasted quietly up to the deceased 
without a warning signal. Nonetheless, her legal duty was 
not limited to listening for the engine. Her duty consisted 
of exercising reasonable care by both looking and listening. 
See Butler v. Payne, supra, and Jensen v. Oregon Short 
Line Ry. Co., 59 Utah 367, 204 P. 101, for just two of the 
many Utah cases announcing this rule. 
With respect to the fourth explanation, counsel. urge 
against the evidence and against their own previous argu-
ment that the train could have been moving rapidly under 
power down the track until shortly before the colllision, 
when it was quietly braked down to a speed of about 10 
miles per hour and coasted into the deceased. Thus they 
argue that the jury could have found that even if deceased 
had looked at any point when within 10 feet of the track, 
it might be that the train was not there to be seen. Again 
we refer the court to defendant's Exhibit 2 and plaintiffs' 
Exhibits D and I. It will be observed again that the de-
ceased had a clear and unobstructed view up the track for a 
considerable distance. The map shows that the distance 
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from approximately the third of the four poles, counting 
from west to east, to the east side of the bridge shown in 
Exhibit 2 is about 370 feet. The court will observe also that 
the view is clear and unobstructed well beyond the bridge. 
For a clear appreciation of this fact we ask that defendant's 
Exhibit 1 be again ·examined. This exhibit shows the straight 
track running northwesterly far beyond the west end of the 
bridge. Even plaintiffs' Exhibit B shows that the view from 
the approximate point where the body was found-about 
50 feet from the point of the accident-is clear and unob-
structed to the east side of that bridge. The physical facts 
cannot be ignored. These physical facts, as evidenced by 
the above exhibits, show conclusively that if the deceased 
had but looked when at any point from approximately the 
poles to the moment of the accident she would have seen the 
engine approaching. Her failure to do so was negligence, 
and that negligence continued right up to the moment of 
the accident. 
Finally, counsel urge that a jury question was pre-
sented on the question of contributory negligence, citing and 
relying upon the rule announced in Malizia v. Oregon Short 
LineR. Co., 53 Utah 122, 178 P. 756. We can have no quarrel 
with the rule announced in that case, but it is not applicable 
at all to the facts of this case. In the Malizia case several 
circumstances combined to possibly divert the attention of 
the deceased. As the court observed in its opinion, there 
were several trains operating back and forth in front of the 
deceased, and his attention could have been diverted to one 
passing in the opposite direction from the one which struck 
him. It was the possibility that the deceased's .attention was 
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diverted by other train movements and the possibility of 
confusion created in his mind by the several 1novements 
that raised such doubt as to his exercise of due care as to 
create a jury issue on that question. 
Newton v. Oregon Short LineR. Co., 43 Utah 219, 134 
P. 567, which is also relied upon by the plaintiffs, is similar 
in its facts to the Malizia case. The·re the Utah court in an-
nouncing the rule stated : 
"It is true that a party desiring to go on or pass 
over a railroad track must not only look and listen 
for approaching trains, but ordinarily he should so 
look and listen as to make his vigilance effective. 
But whether the traveler must make his vigilance 
effective as against a multiplicity of dangers, when 
such threaten him at the time and place, is, in cases 
like the one at bar, the very question that must be 
determined.'' 
The same argument was made in Jensen v. Oregon 
Short Line Ry. Co., supra, and was disposed of in the fol-
lowing language : 
"The controlling fact in practically all of the 
cases relied on by respondent on this particular ques-
tion is that the person attempting to cross or use 
the street" was at the time of the accident apparently 
or actually confronted with a 'multiplicity of dan-
gers' which tended to confuse, mislead or disconcert 
the mind to such an extent as to leave the matter of 
contributory negligence in doubt." 
In the present case there was nothing that confused 
Mrs. Compton. There are no facts shown to create a doubt 
as to the unreasonableness of her conduct, so there was 
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nothing upon which the jury could act so as to excuse her 
lack of care. 
The court in the Malizia case cites and distinguishes 
Teakle v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 32 Utah 275, 90 P. 
402; Wilkinson v. Oregon Short LineR. Co., 35 Utah 110, 99 
P. 466; Bates v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 38 Utah 
568, 114 P. 527; and Kent v. Ogden, L. & I. Ry. Co., 50 Utah 
388, 167 P. 666. These are all cases in which, as in our 
present case, there was nothing to divert the attention of 
the deceased. In each of these cases it was held that conduct 
similar to that of Mrs. Compton constituted negligence as 
a matter of law. The rule of the Malizia and Newton cases 
is expressed in the Wilkinson case as .follows: 
"* * * In case the traveler has been misled 
by some affirmative act of some employee of the 
railroad company, such as a signaf to proceed from 
a flagman stationed at the crossing, or where he 
has been placed in sudden peril by some act of 
omission or commission by the company, or where 
he is in a situation where danger is threatened from 
different directions and causes, and he has become 
confused thereby and in like instances, he may be 
excused, although he may have gone into a place of 
danger and suffered injury through doing so. To 
afford an excuse, the threatened danger from some 
other source must, however, be imminent. * * *" 
None of the explanations made by counsel can justify 
deceased's failure to exercise due care. The facts show 
that Mrs. Compton was negligent in stepping and walking 
in front of the approaching engine. In the ·face of these 
facts the presumption with which we commenced our con-
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sideration of this issue no longer exists. It fades out of the 
picture and leaves only evidence from which, viewed in any 
reasonable light, can be drawn but one conclusion-that the 
deceased was negligent and her negligence contributed to 
the fatal accident. It follows that the trial court did not 
commit reversible error in so ruling. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT RE-
VERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUB-
MIT THE CASE TO THE JURY ON THE 
THEORY OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE. 
A. Deceased's Negligence Was Contributing and 
Concurring Until the Moment of Impact. 
It is not surprising that the humanitarian doctrine of 
defendant's last clear chance is enshrouded with confusion. 
The doctrine has been abused by attorneys who seek to in-
voke it in almost every instance where the evidence dis-
closes contributory negligence. For a long time in the de-
velopment of the doctrine courts encountered difficulty 
determining just where the principle belonged in the body of 
law, and not until it was treated, rightly or wrongly, as a 
rule of causation did a semblance of order and consistency 
in its application emerge. Even now considerable conflict 
exists among the various jurisdictions with respect to it, 
and care must be exercised in adopting the language of 
opinions from various courts without first examining the 
facts with respect to which the language was meant to 
apply. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
The American Law Institute In its Restatement of 
Torts has sought to resolve some of the conflicting treat-
ment of this. doctrine. In Holmgren v. Union Pac. R. Co., 
. . . Utah ... , 198 P. 2d 459, the Utah Supreme Court, 
speaking through Justice Wolfe, stated that the Utah Court 
has on more than one occasion cited with approval the rule 
of last clear chance stated in the Restatement of Torts. It 
seems to us then that an analysis of the problem of last 
clear chance as applied to the instant case should commence 
with a review of the rule announced in the Restatement. 
Paragraphs 479 and 480 of Restatement of· Torts both 
deal with the question of last clear chance. Paragraph 479 
provides as follows : 
"A plaintiff who has negligently subjected him-
self to a risk of harm from the defendant's subse-
quent negligence may recover for harm caused there-
by if, immediately preceding the harm, 
(a) the plaintiff is unable to avoid it by the 
exercise of reasonable vigilance and care, 
and 
(b) the defendant 
( i) knows of the plaintiff's situation 
and realizes the helpless peril in-
volved therein ; or 
(ii) knows of the plaintiff's situation 
and has reason to realize the peril 
involved therein; or 
(iii) would have discovered the plain-
tiff's situation and thus had reason 
to realize the plaintiff's helpless 
peril had he exercised the vigilance 
which it was his duty to the plain-
tiff to exercise, and 
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(c) Thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize 
with reasonable care and competence his 
then existing ability to avoid harming the 
the plaintiff." (Italics added.) 
This section, then, deals with the situation where the 
plaintiff is physically unable to avoid the consequences of 
his negligence and by reason thereof his fate rests entirely in 
the hands of the defendant. In such a situation the rule 
provides that the defendant is liable if in the exercise of 
reasonable vigilance he should have discovered the plain-
tiff's helpless position in time to avoid injury to him. 
Paragraph 480, which is entitled Last Clear Chance;· 
Negligently Inattentive Plaintiff, and which is the section 
to which Justice Wolfe was making specific reference in 
the Holmgren case referred to above, proyides as follows: 
"A plaintiff who, by the exercise of reasonable 
vigilance could have observed the danger created 
by the defendant's negligence in time to have avoided 
harm therefrom, may recover if, but only if, the 
defendant 
(a) knew of the plaintiff's situation, and 
(b) realized or had reason to realize that the 
plaintiff was inattentive and therefore un-
likely to discover his peril in time to avoid 
the harm, and 
(c) thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize 
with reasonable care and competence his 
then existing ability to avoid harming the · 
plaintiff." (Italics added.) 
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Paragraph 480 then deals with the situation where the 
plaintiff is physically able to avoid the consequence of his 
negligence but because of negligent inattention fails to do so. 
In such a situation the Restatement holds that the defendant 
is liable only if it knew of the plaintiff's position and real-
ized or should have realized that plaintiff was inattentive 
and thereafter negligently fails to avoid injuring him. 
If we analyze the cases in the light of the rules of the 
~estatement, the first question would seem to be whether or 
not the plaintiff was physically unable to avoid the injury 
to himself or was merely negligently inattentive, and the 
second question would be whether or not the defendant 
actually saw the plaintiff in a position of peril in time to 
avoid injury to him. 
A review of the Utah cases discloses that the court 
has consistently reasoned as the compilers of the Restate-
ment reason, and has consistently reached the same results 
as those recommended in the Restatement. 
One of the earlier Utah cases dealing with the doctrine 
of last clear chance, and a case which has been extensively 
cited and quoted both in Utah and in other jurisdictions 
and is somewhat of a landmark on the subject, is Teakle 
v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 32 Utah 276, 90 P. 402. 
This case is cited and quoted by plaintiffs as authority for 
their argument that last clear chance applies in our present 
case. A review of this case is invaluable to our present 
analysis because in it we have an illustration of the fact 
situation contemplated both by Rule 479 and Rule 480 of 
the Restatement of Torts. In this case the deceased was 
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walking along a track in the north yard of the defendant 
railroad company at Salt Lake City. A switch engine was 
backing along the track in the same direction the deceased 
was walking. The crew failed to see the deceased and 
struck him or his clothing just enough to knock him to the 
ground. He was not run over by the train, was not killed, 
but was rendered helpless. After the deceased was knocked 
to the ground members of the crew observed him in his 
perilous position. They tried to signal the engineer, but the 
inattentive engineer failed to observe the signals and was 
therefore unaware of the deceased's peril. The engine con-
tinued to back slowly until the pilot of the cowcatcher on 
the engine, which extended out beyond the rest of the 
engine, struck, crushed and killed the deceased who was 
lying alongside the track. Because the switching movement 
was slow, there was ample time to stop the engine between 
the time the deceased was struck and the time he was 
crushed by the pilot had the engineer been attentive. We 
thus have a fact situation in which a negligently inattentive 
man was struck and knocked down by a negligently inatten-
tive train cre'\v. Up to the time he was struck the deceased 
was able to avoid the consequences of his negligence by the 
exercise of reasonable vigilance. This then is a situation 
contemplated by paragraph 480 of the Restatement of Torts. 
We would expect the court to hold that the defendant was 
not liable unless it knew of deceased's perilous situation. 
That is the ruling of the court. We quote from the decision 
at page 408 in the Pacific Reporter: 
"* * * His act of walking or stepping on the 
track in front of the moving train without observa-
tion, as shown by the evidence, rendered him guilty 
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of negligence as. rna tter of law. We think this is true 
whether he was walking between the two tracks 
east of the main track, or between the main track 
and the track immediately east of it. In either event, 
the evidence shows that he stepped upon the switch 
track in front of the moving train, when but to look, 
or otherwise to lise ordinary care on his part, would 
have disclosed to him the approach of the train. 
(Cases cited.) Such negligence on the part of the 
deceased was a concurring and contributing cause 
of the collision, and barred all right of recovery for 
whatever injury resulted therefrom, upon the prin-
ciple of law that when the negligence of two persons 
is contemporaneous, and the fault of each operates 
directly to cause the injury, neither can recover from 
the other except for a willful or wanton infliction of 
the injury. If, therefore, the deceased's death was 
caused by the train's striking him, his contributory 
negilgence barred recovery, for there is nothing to 
show that the train's striking the deceased was done 
willfully or wantonly. * * *" 
The court then goes on to discuss the fact situation 
presented after the deceased was struck and knocked down. 
In such a situation the man was helpless. Although he had 
been negligent, still, because of being knocked to the ground, 
he was physically unable to avoid the consequences of that 
negligence by the exercise of reasonable vigilance. This 
then is a situation contemplated in paragrapp. 4 79 of the 
Restatement of Torts. We might expect the court to rule 
that if the defendant should in the exercise of reasonable 
vigilance have discovered the helpless position of the plain-
tiff in time to avoid injuring him, then the defendant was 
liable. This is the conclusion reached by the court. It dis-
cusses the question of whether the Utah Court is committed 
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to the so-called doctrine of conscious last clear chance, or 
discovered peril, rejects that proposition, and holds that 
under such a fact situation the plaintiff can recover. Cer-
tainly this case illustrates that the rules of the Restatement 
of Torts constitute the law in the State of Utah. 
Ryan v. Union Pac. R. Co., 46 Utah 530, 151 P. 71, is 
a case similar to the case under consideration on its facts 
except only that there was more reason for application of 
the doctrine of last clear chance in. the Ryan case than in 
the instant case for the reason that the operators of the 
defendant's train had a clear opportunity to avoid the col-
lision had they observed the deceased. In this case the de-
ceased was struck by a locomotive as he walked ·down the 
defendant's tracks traveling in the same direction as the 
locomotive. The death occurred in an area where the tracks 
of the defendant were in regular use by pedestrians and 
others. In one view of the evidence the deceased walked 
40 or 50 feet down the track before being struck and killed; 
in another view of the evidence he walked as far as 400 
feet do,vn the track in front of the locomotive. The train 
crew failed to see hhn until after he was struck. If we 
analyze the facts of this case in the light of the rules of 
the Restatement of Torts, vve find that it is a situation 
conter:.1plated by paragraph 480-that is, a negligently in-
attentive plaintiff, or one who by the exercise of reasonable 
vigilance could have observed his position of danger in 
time to have avoided harm therefrom. Applying the rule of 
paragraph 480, the evidence failed to show that the operators 
of defendant's train knew of the plaintiff~s situation. We 
might anticipate a conclusion that this was not a case in 
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which the doctrine of last clear chance should be applied. 
We quote from the court's decision on page 75 of the Pacific 
Reporter: 
"The court, however, submitted the case also on 
the theory that, though the train crew had not dis-
covered the deceased, yet, if they, in the exercise of 
ordinary care, could have discovered him in time to 
have avoided the collision and, omitting to exercise 
that care, failed to discover him, then the defendant's 
negligence was the proximate cause. In this the court 
also erred, not because the doctrine is applicable only 
to cases after discovery, for we are committed to the 
rule that the doctrine, in a proper case, is also ap-
plicable where the perilous situation of the party in-
jured could or ought to have been discovered, but, 
because the assumed negligence of both parties was, 
in such respect, active, concurring, combining, and 
contributing at the very time of the impact, and the 
one as direct and proximate as the other; that is, 
if the defendant be found guilty of negligence in 
not giving signals of the trairt's approach, or in not 
observing a proper lookout to discover the presence 
of those reasonably expected to be on or near the 
track and in danger of being struck· by moving cars, 
and if the deceased, as he was walking along the 
track, also be found guilty of negligence in failing to 
look for and to discover the train's approach, then 
the negligence of both was active and concurring up 
to the very time of the impact, and the collision the 
result of the combined and concurring negligence of 
both, and the one as direct and proximate as the 
other. In such case the most that could be said is as 
to which negligence, when the one is compared with 
the other, was the greater or more culpable. But the 
doctrine of comparative negligence does not prevail 
in this jurisdiction, and is not to be confused, as it 
sometimes is, with the doctrine of the last clear 
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chance. The rule here is that contributory negligence, 
if it is a direct and contributing cause, bars recov-
ery. ''lhen the court charged, as it did, that if the 
defendant was guilty of negligence, and though the 
deceased was guilty of contributory negligence, and 
that 'the negligence of each directly contributed to 
the injury,' yet, if the defendant, in the exercise of 
ordinary care, could have discovered the deceased in 
a position of peril in time to have avoided the injury, 
then the defendant's negligence was the proximate 
and the deceased's the remote cau&e, it in effect 
destroyed the defense of contributqry negligence 
and gave a charge inconsistent with another that, 
though the defendant was negligent yet, if the de-
ceased 'was also negligent in any respeat,s in the per-
formance of his own duty, and that neglect con-
tributed in any degree to his accident and death, the 
plaintiff in this case cannot complain that the de-
fendant was also negligent, but your verdict in such 
event must be for the defendant.' " 
Knutson v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 78 Utah 145, 2 
P. 2d 102, is a case in which the court deals with last clear 
chance. In this case _the decedent, a small boy, apparently 
either went to sleep on the tracks of the defendant railroad 
or was a victim of sunstroke. The engineer of the defend-
ant's train failed to see, or at least to distinguish the boy 
as a human being, upon the tracks and in his position of 
peril until it was too late for him to stop the train, although 
there was evidence that he should have been able to recognize 
the object as a child had he been reasonably vigilant. The 
question was whether the contributory negligence of the 
child, a licensee, in lying upon the tracks of the· defendant 
barred recovery in this action by its parents, or whether the 
defendant railroad company was liable under the doctrine 
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of last clear chance. The trial court instructed the jury 
as follows: 
"If· you find that Chester Knutson went upon 
the track of the defendant railroad company as a 
licensee and there fell asleep, then, even though you 
may find that such conduct was negligent, you are 
instructed that the negligence of the said Chester 
Knutson ceased at the moment he lost consciousness 
in sleep and you are instructed that so long as he 
remained asleep and oblivious to the danger attend-
ant upon his position and unable to escape, the act 
of sleeping upon said track was not such negligence 
-as will bar the plaintiff's action for damages if you 
should find that the defendant could, in the exercise 
of reasonable care, have discovered the perilous 
position of the said Chester Knutson in time to warn 
him and avoid striking him." 
The Supreme Court approved of this instruction in the 
following language : 
"If the Knutson boy was asleep or for other 
reason was unconscious at the time in question, the 
so-called doctrine of last clear chance was ·clearly 
applicable. * * · *" 
It will be observed that in this case both the trial court 
and the Supreme Court would apply the doctrine of last 
clear chance only if it were determined a.s a question of fact 
that the deceased child was asleep or otherwise unconscious 
and thus that its negligence had come to rest. Before the 
court would impose liability under the doctrine of last clear 
chance, then, in a situation where the defendant failed to 
observe the deceased in a position of peril, it required that 
the facts presented came within the rule of paragraph 479 
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of the Restatement of Torts-that is, where the deceased 
because of unconsciousness was unable to avoid the con-
sequences of his own negligence. 
The latest Utah case dealing with last clear chance we 
find is Andersen v. B~~ngham & Garfield Ry. Co., . . . Utah 
... , 214 P. 2d 607. Although this case does not involve the 
precise question we are now concerned with, paragraph 480 
of the Restatement of Torts is again quoted and approved. 
In its Instruction No. 12 on last clear chance the trial court 
in this Andersen case instructed the jury in part as follows: 
"Even though an injured party, through his 
own negligence, placed himself in a position of peril, 
he may, nevertheless, recover if the one who injures 
him discovers, or by the exercise of ordinary. care, 
should have discovered him and have avoided the 
injury." 
If our view of last clear chance is correct, it will be 
seen that the above statement of the law is too broad in 
that it extends the rule of Teakle v. San Pedro L.A. & S. L. 
R. Co. to the situation of a negligently inattentive plaintiff. 
It goes much further than the rule of paragraph 480 Re-
statement of Torts. It was unnecessary for the court in its 
opinion to consider this error in the above instruction. The 
falacy in the instruction apparenty did not go unnoticed, 
however, for the court makes this statement with respect 
thereto: 
"* * * Nor do we express any opinion as to 
whether Instruction No. 12 was erroneous ·in other 
particulars." 
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We find other cases in the Utah reports dealing with 
the subject of last clear chance. We have analyzed only 
three as clearly illustrating the position which the Utah 
court has taken with respect to this controversial doctrine. 
Among the more recent cases, Holmgren v. Union Pac. R. 
Co., supra, supports this position. In that portion of the 
opinion quoted hereinafter under point B, it will be ob-
served the court stresses the requirement that the defend-
ant's chance to avoid the accident be the last chance. We 
find no cases in the Utah reports that deviate in any par-
ticular from the sound rules announced in the above cases 
and supported by the American Law Institute in its Re-
statement of Torts. According to American Jurisprudence, 
the Utah rules are in accord with those announced by a 
majority of the courts in this country. Paragraph 223, 38 
American Juris prudence, Negligence, deals with a situation 
where the injured person is physically unable to escape, and 
paragraph 224 deals with a situation where the injured 
person is physically able to es.cape. We quote paragraph 223 
in part as follows.: 
"Considering the origin of the last clear chance 
doctrine and its nature as a rule of proximate cause, 
it should be applied to permit a recovery by a plain-
tiff whose original negligence had culminated in a 
position of peril from which he was unable to ex-
tricate himself even by the performance of due care 
on his part, against a defendant who, by the exercise 
of reasonable care, could have avoided injuring the 
plaintiff if he had discovered the danger to the 
plaintiff as he reasonably ought to have done, not-
withstanding he did not discover it. * * *" 
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We quote paragraph 224 as follows: 
"The great weight of judicial authority denies 
the application of the last clear chance doctrine in 
the situation where the defendant, while under a 
duty to discover the danger to the injured person, did 
not actually discover it and the injured person was 
physically able to escape from the peril at any time 
up to the moment of impact. Such view is certainly 
consistent with the proximate cause view of the doc-
trine. * * *" 
Also in 44 American Jurisprudence, Railroads, para-
graph 489 it is stated: 
"The great weight of judicial authority denie·s 
the application of the last clear chance doctrine in 
the situation where the defendant, while under a 
duty to discover the danger to the injured person, did 
not actually discover it and the injured person was 
physically able to escape from the peril at any time 
up to the moment of impact. Accordingly, the doc-
trine does not apply to the situation where the rail-
road company, while under a duty to discover a 
person in a position of danger upon its, tracks or 
adjacent thereto, did not actually discover his peril 
and the imperiled person was physically able to 
escape from the peril in time to avoid injury." 
Because of the great divergence of views as to the 
proper application of the doctrine of last clear chance, and 
because the position which the Utah court has taken on the 
subject is clear and unequivocal and the law in this jurisdic-
tion may be said to be settled, little can be accomplished by 
reference to opinions from other jurisdictions. Many of those 
opinions are as a matter of fact misleading. Thus, in Cali-
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fornia there are cases in which the court interprets "physi-
cally unable to escape" as applying to a situation where the 
plaintiff is negligently oblivious of his danger. It would 
seem that the California court extends the, application of the 
doctrine further than it would be extended in Utah or under 
the rules of the Restatement of Torts. The truth is, however, 
as examination of the California cases will show, the Cali-
fornia court makes a much narrower application than does 
the Utah court, since it limits the doctrine to what has been 
termed the conscious last clear chance. 
The case that we find most frequently quoted among 
California decisions is Girdnerv. Union Oil Co. of California, 
13 P. 2d 915, in which the court announces the rule as fol-
lows: 
"Whether or not, therefore, negligence is the 
proximate or remote cause is, as above stated, a 
question of fact in each particular case. The doc-
trine of continuing negligence has no applica~ion 
unless the negligence is the proximate cause of the 
injury. On the other hand, if all the elements of 
the last clear chance doctrine are present and plain-
tiff's negligence becomes remote in causation, then 
this doctrine applies. If any one of the elements of 
the last clear chance doctrine is absent, then plain-
tiff's negligence remains the proximate cause and 
bars recovery. But the continuous negligence rule 
does not apply to a situation in which the last clear 
chance rule, by the presence of its own elements, is 
brought into operation. Where these necessary ele-
ments are lacking, courts have declared, and right-
fully so, that plaintiff's negligence being continuous 
and contributory with that of defendant bars a 
recovery. The necessary elements, as deduced from 
the well-considered cases, may be stated in substance 
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as follows: That plaintiff has been negligent and, as 
a result thereof, is in a position of danger from 
which he cannot escape by the exercise of ordinary 
care; and this includes not only where it is physi-
cally impossible for him to escape, but also in cases 
'vhere he is totally unaware of his danger and for 
that reason unable to escape; that defendant has 
kno~vledge that the plaintiff is in such a situation, 
and knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care should 
know, that plaintiff cannot escape from such situa-
tion, and has the last clear chance to a void the 
accident by exercising ordinary care, and fails to 
exercise the same, and the accident results thereby, 
and plaintiff is injured as the proximate result of 
such failure. It has been said that such failure by 
defendant to use ordinary care under such circum-
stances amounts to a degree of reckless conduct that 
may well be termed willful and wanton, and when 
an act is thus committed, contributory negligence 
upon the part of the person injured is not an element 
which will defeat a recovery." (Italics added.) 
It will be observed therefore that the California court 
limits the doctrine of last clear chance to those cases in 
which the defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff is in a 
perilous situation. It refuses to recognize the rule of para-
graph 479 of the Restatement of Torts, which rule has been 
recognized by the Utah court from the beginning, or at least 
since Teakle v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co. 
Plaintiff cites Huggans v. Southern Pac. Co., (Cal.) 
207 P. 2d 864, as a case in point, but the facts as stated by 
the court show that the engineer of the train saw the 
plaintiff before the collision. 
The Supreme Court of Washington adheres to the Utah 
rule and the rule of the Restatement of Torts. In Thompson 
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v. Porter, 151 P. 2d 433, the Washington court quotes and 
reaffirms the earlier decision in Mosso v. E. H. Stanton Co., 
75 Wash. 220, 134 P. 941, as follows: 
" 'The courts are wide of an agreement as to the 
extent of the last clear chance doctrine as applied 
to the operation of trains, street cars, automobiles, 
and the like. But what we conceive to be the sounder 
view is this: Assuming that a traveler has negli-
gently placed himself in a dangerous situation upon 
the highway, then, as we have seen, whenever the 
person in control of such agency actually sees the 
traveler's situation and should appreciate his danger, 
the last chance rule applies without regard to the 
continuing negligence of the traveler concurring with 
that of the operator up to the very instant of the 
injury. A second situation to which the rule applies 
is this: Where the person in control of such agency 
by keeping a reasonably careful lookout, commen-
surate with the dangerous character of the agency 
and the nature of the locality, could have discovered 
and appreciated the traveler's perilous situation in 
time, by the exercise of reasonable care, to avoid 
injuring him, and injury results. from the failure to 
keep such lookout and to exercise such care, then the 
last chance rule applies, regardless of the traveler's 
prior negligence, whenever that negligence has ter-
minated or culminated in a situation of peril, from 
which the exercise of ordinary care on his part would 
not thereafter extricate him. This last phase of the 
rule applies whenever injury results from new negli-
gence or from a continuance of the operator's negli-
gence after that of the traveler has so ceased or 
culmina ted. 
"The application of the rule to the first situa-
tion as above indicated needs no support outside of 
simple considerations of humanity. Any other view 
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would condone willful or wanton injury. The applica-
tion of the rule to the second situation indicated 
has been sustained by this court, and we· think 
soundly, in a case of injury to an automobile stalled 
through its owner's negligence on a railway crossing. 
* * * 
··An examination of a vast number of authorities 
induces our conviction that the application of the 
rule as above outlined is much broader than that 
countenanced by many courts and is as broad as can 
be applied without in effect overruling all of our 
own decisions sustaining the defense of contributory 
negligence and adopting in its stead the doctrine of 
comparative negligence, a doctrine against which 
this court has set its face from the beginning. 
* * *' " 
We believe this is a good statement of the law. 
There is a clear application of the rule by the Washing-
ton court in Hopp v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. et al., 147 P. 2d 
950. In this case the deceased was struck by defendant's 
train at a railroad crossing. The court denied the· plain-
tiff's attempt to invoke the doctrine of last clear chance in 
the following words : 
"The respondent failed to produce any evidence 
that indicated the existence of either of the two 
situations where the last clear chance doctrine ap-
plies: namely, (1) where the operator of the in-
strumentality which inflicted the injury actually saw 
the perilous situation of the other party and by the 
exercise of reasonable care, could have avoided the 
injury, and (2) where the operator of the instru-
mentality which inflicted the injury should have 
seen and recognized the peril of the other party 
whose own negligence had ceased leaving him in a 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
38 
position of danger from which he could not extricate 
himself. See Leftridge v.. City of Seattle, 130 Wash. 
541, 228 P. 302, which is a land mark case that has 
been followed consistently by this court. 
"The engineer did not see the car of the de-
ceased prior to the collision ; hence, the first aspect 
of the last clear chance doctrine cannot be applied; 
and, since there is no evidence whatever that the 
deceased was in an inextricable position, the second 
aspect of the last clear chance doctrine cannot be 
applied." 
Plaintiffs at page 20 of their brief quote comment b 
of The Restatement of Torts, Section 480. This comment, as 
will be seen from a cursory reading, deals with the question 
as to whether or not the defendant should realize plaintiff 
is negligently inattentive, after he has been observed by the 
defendant. 
At page 23 of his brief the plaintiff quotes Graham v. 
Johnson, 109 Utah 346, 166 Pac. (2d) 230, but a reading-of 
the entire opinion clearly shows that the court is speaking 
of a situation where, as in that case, the defendant saw 
the plaintiff and realized or should have realized he was in 
peril. Plaintiff has not produced a single case from Utah 
or elsewhere that extends the doctrine as far as he requests 
the court to extend it in this case. 
There are three requirements to the rule of Section 
480 of the Restatement of Torts. All three of them must 
exist before the rule is applicable. It is the second require-
ment-that the defendant realized or had reason to realize 
the plaintiff was inattentive-that has caused most of the 
difficulty in applying the rule. It is the second requirement 
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with which most of the cases are concerned. In reading the 
decisions with respect to this portion of Section 480, we are 
prone to forget or ignore the first requirement viz, that the 
defendant knew of the plaintiff's situation. In no case that 
we have found, however, has the Utah court forgotten or 
ignored the first requirement. In all cases we have found 
the Utah court has denied the application of the rule when 
the first requirement of paragraph 480 was not met. 
It is undisputed in this case that the train crew did not 
see Mrs. Compton. There is no question but what the case 
does not come within the rule of Section 480 because the 
engine crew did not know of Mrs. Compton's situation. The 
requirement o~ subparagraph (a) is missing. There is no 
question but what it does not come within the rule of Sec-
tion 479 because the deceased was negligently inattentive. 
Again the requirement of subparagraph (a) of Section 479 
is not met. This case falls within the rule of Ryan v. Union 
Pac. R. Co., supra, and the first rule of Teakle v. San Pedro, 
L. A. & S. L. R. Co., supra. It is not a last clear chance case. 
It is a case of the deceased's negligence concurring and con-
tributing up to the moment of impact, and the trial court 
committed no error in so ruling. 
B. The Defendant Did Not Have the Last Clear 
Chance to A void the Accident. 
If we assume, contrary to the clear expression of the 
Utah court in all cases in which it has treated the subject, 
that we are wrong in the preceding argument, still no error 
was committed by the trial court in denying application of 
the last clear chance doctrine. The evidence adduced at the 
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trial does not show the engine crew had a last clear op-
portunity to avoid the collision. The deceased walked only 
25 feet from the time she left the stairway to the point of 
impact. Even at its closest point the track was 171;2 feet 
from the bottom of the stairway. The physical facts and the 
testimony of Officer Feller may be used to explain Mrs. 
Laws' testimony that she and the deceased took "a few 
steps" down the track before the impact, and that evidence 
shows she could not have walked down the track more than 
two or three steps and could not have been in a position of 
peril along the track more than a second or two before 
being struck. Plaintiffs argue that the deceased was in a 
position of peril from the moment she left the stairs and 
proceeded toward the track, and a Missouri case is cited as 
authority. Perhaps Missouri with its extremely broad con-
cept of last clear chance will support them in that position, 
but the Utah cases do not. In Holmgren v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Co., . . . Utah ... , 198 P. 2d 459, the court quotes 
with approval the opinion from Johnson v. Sacramento 
Northern Ry., 54 Cal. App. 2d 528, 129 P. 2d 503, as follows: 
" 'It is also significant to note that the "situa-
tion of danger" or "position of danger," referred to 
in the authorities dealing with the last clear chance 
doctrine, is reached only when a plaintiff, moving 
toward the path of an oncoming train or vehicle, has 
reached a position "from which he cannot escape by 
the exercise of ordinary care." In other words, it 
~is not enough, under the last clear chance 1 .doctrine, 
that plaintiff is merely approaching a position of 
danger, for until he has reached a position of danger, 
he has the same opportunity to avoid the accident by 
:the exercise of ordinary care, as has the: defendant. 
In such cases the ordinary rules of negligence and 
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contributory negligence apply, rather than the ex-
ceptional doctrine of last clear chance. It is only in 
cases in which, after plaintiff reaches a position of 
danger, defendant has a last clear chance to avoid 
the accident by the exercise of ordinary care, and 
plaintiff has no similar chance, that the doctrine is 
applicable.' (Italics added.)" 
"And also: 
'It must be remembered that the last clear 
chance doctrine involves just what its name implies. 
As this court said in Poncino v. Reid-Murdock & Co., 
136 Cal. App. 223, at page 227, 28 P. 2d 932, at page 
934, "In other words, it is not enough to relieve a 
plaintiff of his own negligence that the defendant 
may have had a chance to avoid the accident, but de-
fendant must have had the last chance and also had 
a clear chance to do so by the exercise of ordinary 
care. That he should have had the last chance im-
plies that his chance to avoid the accident must have 
come later in point of time than any similar chance 
on the part of the injured person. That he should 
have had a clear chance implies that he must have 
had more than a bare possible chance to avoid an 
unexpected peril created practically simultaneously 
with the happening of the accident by the negligence 
of the injured party".' " 
In Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 112 
Utah 189, 186 P. 2d 293, the court stated: 
"The opportunity to avoid the accident must not 
be a possibility, it must be a clear opportunity." 
And 
'' * * * if the doctrine of last clear chance 
is to be invoked it must clearly appear that time per-
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mitted the train crew to appreciate the deceased's 
predicament and to give warning sufficiently early 
enough for the deceased to extricate himself, or the 
time element was sufficient to permit the crew to 
bring the train to a stop." 
In Graham v. Johnson, 109 Utah 346, 166 P. 2d 230, 
the court stated: 
"One should not be held liable for failing to 
avoid the effect of the other's negligence in a situa-
tion where it is speculative as to whether he was 
afforded a clear opportunity to avoid it. In a situa-
tion where both parties are on the move the signifi-
cance of the word 'clear' is most important. Other-
wise we may put the onus of avoiding the effect of 
one's negligence on a party not negligent. That 
party's negligence only arises when it is definitely 
established that there was ample time and opportun-
ity to avoid the accident which was not taken ad-
vantage of." 
On the rehearing of the Graham case the court re-
emphasized and strengthened the requirement that the 
defendant's last chance be a clear opportunity. We quote 
from the opinion on rehearing, 109 Utah 365, 172 P. 2d 665: 
"When on'e party thrusts upon another the onus 
of avoiding an accident which was due entirely to the 
fact that the first party is in the fairly rapid pro-
cess of placing himself in the path of a car driven 
by the second party, the court, before it permits the 
jury to determine whether the second party could 
have avoided the accident, must be reasonably sure 
that there was time enough for the jury to so find. 
Where the situation is, to reasonable minds, so 
doubtful as to whether the second party had time to 
avoid it, the matter should not be given to the jury; 
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otherwise, '\Ve are, as said in the case of Thomas v. 
Sadleir, Utah, 162 P. 2d 112, 115, in grave danger 
of permitting the one really at 'fault to shift the 
blame for the accident on the other by accentuation 
· of the other's duty to avoid the effect of the first 
one's negligence.' 
* * * * * 
"Her opportunity to avoid the accident must not 
be a mere possibility but a clear opportunity." 
See also J.llarshall v. Ogden Ry. & Depot Co., ... Utah 
... , 221 P. 2d 868. 
It is difficult to apply the rules of these recent cases to 
the facts of our present case wherein the evidence shows 
that the def~ndant never did see the negligent plaintiff 
until after the fatal collision. But, nonetheless, these cases 
make clear the position of the Utah court on the ·subject 
of last clear chance. If a plaintiff would have the court 
invoke the doctrine in his favor, he must show by some 
evidence that the defendant had a clear opportunity and not 
just a mere possibility to avoid the collision. 
In any view of the evidence, taking all reasonable in~ 
ferences therefrom most favorable to the plaintiffs, the 
deceased could not have been in a position of peril for more 
than a second or two. If this is a last clear chance case. at 
all, the defendant's obligation under that doctrine arose only 
at the time she entered that position of peril. Commencing 
at that moment, the evidence must show defendant had a 
clear opportunity ·for observation, accurate reflection and 
effective reaction with the means at hand. Reason argues 
strongly against even a bare possibility that the tragedy 
could have been so prevented, and it closes the door against 
the suggestion that there was then a clear opportunity to 
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avoid it. It follows that the action of the trial court in re-
fusing to submit the case to the jury under the issue of last 
clear chance should be sustained. 
The evidence disclosing as a matter of law that the de-
ceased was contributorily negligent, that negligence bars 
any recovery by these plaintiffs. Van Wagoner v. Union 
Pac. Ry. Co., 112 Utah 189, 186 P. 2d 293. 
CONCLUSION 
As stated earlier in our brief, we believe the answers 
to all the various questions involved in this appeal are to be 
found in the Utah Reports. We have avoided reference to 
other authorities except in one or two instances to show ·~ 
that the Utah rule is in line with the majority or with what 
text authorities view as the better reasoning. In any event, 
the law as announced by the Utah court is that which 
governed the conduct of Mrs. Compton and the defendant's 
engine crew at the time of this accident. That law was the 
light in which the judge·was required to view the evidence 
at the trial. In so doing the trial court committed no re-
versible error and the judgment entered should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
HOWARD F. CORAY, 
D. A. ALSUP, 
Counse.l for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
10 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
